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Joel Amernic & Russell Craig
ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the relationship between leadership language and 
the safety culture at British Petroleum [BP] prior to the April 20, 2010 
Deepwater Horizon explosion in the Gulf of Mexico. The discursive 
construction of important aspects of safety culture in a large, risky, 
global company such as BP is a central feature of the CEO’s role. Using 
a social constructionist perspective, we conduct an interpretative close 
reading analysis of the speech of BP’s [then] CEO, Tony Hayward, at 
the Annual General Meeting of BP on April 15, 2010. We also analyse 
the transcripts of 18 other speeches Hayward delivered before the 
Deepwater Horizon explosion. We find that the language used 
contributed rhetorically to an ideology of economic efficiency and cost 
control, in a manner that was inconsistent with an enduring safety 
culture. We highlight important insights that close reading analysis of 
the narrative in CEO speeches can provide to help understand a 
corporation’s ambient safety culture.  
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1. Introduction 
At 9:45 pm on April 20, 2010, an explosion rocked the British Petroleum [BP] 
Deepwater Horizon oil drilling platform anchored about 41 miles off the coast of 
Louisiana in the Gulf of Mexico. Eleven workers were killed and many others were 
injured (Elkind et al., 2011). The resultant oilspill from the ruptured wellhead was 
described by [then] U.S. President Obama as ‘the worst environmental disaster America 
has ever faced’ (Obama, 2010). 
In this paper we explore roles that CEO language played in contributing to, or 
detracting from, the ambient safety culture at BP1 preceding the Deepwater Horizon 
disaster. Directing attention to CEO language is consistent with the view that ‘the words 
used by a CEO constitute an asset’ (Leibbrand, 2015, p. 45) in strategic communication. 
Even more importantly, they can reveal important aspects of the CEO’s leadership-
through-language (Amernic and Craig, 2006). We focus particularly on the prepared 
speech of the CEO at BP’s annual general meeting (AGM). In doing so, we offer an 
example of the benefit of according serious attention to a neglected medium — a CEO’s 
AGM speech. We refer to CEO language as CEO-speak, consistent with the 
terminology of Amernic and Craig (2006).  
                                                          
1 Although the physical platform was legally owned (and to an extent) serviced by legal entities other than those in 
the BP group, BP was the controlling power in the supply chain. This paper focuses on the tone set by the CEO of 
the dominant business entity involved, BP, regarding the discursive construction of safety.  
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Our primary focus is on the speech delivered by BP’s CEO Tony Hayward to the 
company’s 2010 AGM, held five days before the disaster. In doing so, we draw attention 
to a particular accounting-related aspect of the narrative: the tension between economic 
efficiency (including cost control) and the desire for a strong safety culture. Though 
Hayward claimed that his ‘number one priority’ was safety, perversely ‘safety’ is hardly 
mentioned at all, while cost cutting, financial matters, and organizational efficiency 
dominate. We highlight Hayward’s strong focus on cost cutting, financial matters and 
organisational efficiency. We also compare the intertextual dynamic between Hayward’s 
speeches during his tenure as CEO of BP before the 2010 AGM, and the speeches of 
his immediate predecessor from 1997 to 2007, Lord Browne of Madingley.  
The specific research question we address is: ‘Did the language used in the AGM 
speech by BP CEO Hayward five days prior to the Deepwater Horizon disaster reflect a 
tone at the top of BP that was inconsistent with an enduring safety culture?’ Our interest 
centres on understanding how CEO-speak influenced, or reflected, BP’s safety culture 
at the time of the explosion. 
We respond to calls by Beelitz and Merkl-Davies (2012), Brennan and Conroy 
(2013), Craig et al. (2012), and Amernic et al. (2007), for close analysis of the written 
and oral discourse of powerful business leaders. Additionally, we are motivated by the 
prospect that analysis of the ‘organizational talk’ (Rasmussen, 2011) of CEOs of major 
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corporations (such as in their public speeches) can ‘provide a window on the culture [of 
an organisation] and its approach to safety’ (Ocasio, 2005, p. 118). 
A focus on safety seems long overdue in the accounting literature. The substantial 
literature on social and environmental accounting features many references to the 
importance of safety-related disclosures and accountability. Yet, a search using Google 
Scholar reveals that the word ‘safety’ does not appear in the title of any article published 
in a major peer-reviewed scholarly journal in accounting. 
Nonetheless, the accounting-related literature on safety is not silent. For example, 
in the business ethics literature, Beelitz and Merkl-Davies (2012) analyse how CEO 
discourse was used to restore legitimacy after a major accident at a nuclear power plant 
in Germany. Amernic et al. (2010) explore language and leadership (including safety) 
issues at BP through the lens of the BP CEO’s annual report letters to shareholders 
from 1998 to 2006. Amernic et al. (2012) discuss pre-disaster financial reporting 
implications for a reporting entity (BP) with an inapt safety culture. 
In the decade prior to the Deepwater Horizon explosion the language of BP’s top 
management did not reflect a strong safety culture. Interest in safety at BP was linked 
inextricably with, and subsumed by, a broader organisational culture that stressed 
achievement of operational efficiency. BP’s broader organisational culture arose from a 
strong emphasis on the pursuit of cost efficiency and profits. The discourse of BP CEOs 
Hayward and Browne suggests that BP paid only trivial attention to safety.  
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This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant literature, proposes a 
working definition of safety culture, and proposes metaphor, ideology and rhetoric as an 
analytical framework. Section 3 explains some relevant aspects of BP’s context at the 
time of the Deepwater Horizon disaster. It also links the potential influence of CEO-
speak to the safety culture of a complex organization, and highlights the importance of 
the CEO’s AGM speech. Section 4 explains the research method and data sources. 
Section 5 analyses Hayward’s speech at BP’s AGM in 2010, and links our observations 
back to theoretical concerns with metaphor, ideology and rhetoric. Section 6 discusses 
the results further and offers some conclusions. Throughout the paper we adopt a social 
constructionist perspective, with the intent to highlight three constructs (ideology, 
rhetoric and metaphor) and the interplay among them. 
 
2. Analytical framework: Safety culture, metaphor, ideology and rhetoric 
2.1 Safety culture 
‘Safety culture’ has been defined in numerous ways. Turner and Gray (2009, p. 
1259) observe that although ‘safety is largely characterize[d] … as a disembodied, 
tangible and easily quantifiable phenomenon’ there are many ‘contested meanings of 
safety’ (p. 1261). Edwards et al. (2013), Choudhry et al. (2007), and Guldenmund 
(2000) reveal the ambiguity and contestability of the general concept of ‘culture’, and 
‘safety culture’ more particularly. Antonsen (2009, p. 184) has drawn attention to the 
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‘considerable [on-going] disagreement and confusion about what safety culture really 
is…’ Ocasio (2005, p. 120) points out that the Columbia [space shuttle] Accident 
Investigation Board Report in 2003 did not define the terms ‘safety’ or ‘safety culture.’ 
Rather, in a simplistic and perhaps naïve way, it treated these terms implicitly as 
‘objective and unproblematic.’ Below we review recent debate regarding the definition of 
‘safety culture.’ We then propose a working definition. 
Silbey (2009, p. 343) conceived safety culture as ‘causal attitude’, as ‘engineered 
organization’, and as ‘emergent.’ She argued that the first two perspectives ‘… 
reproduce individualist and reductionist epistemologies that are unable to reliably 
explain social or system performance’ (p. 343). As a consequence, she noted that 
safety culture ‘is often … measurable and malleable in terms of the attitudes and 
behaviors of individual actors, often the lowest-level actors, with least authority, in the 
organizational hierarchy’ (2009, p. 343). Silbey’s third conception of safety culture, as 
‘emergent’, envisages a complex system involving ‘… cultural conflict, competing sets of 
interests within organizations, and inequalities in power and authority’ (2009, pp. 343-4). 
This conception seems consistent with Haukelid’s (2008, p. 417) view that ‘safety 
culture should not be something separate from — or in addition to — an organizational 
culture.’  
Although we do not debate the relationship between ‘culture’ and ‘organizational 
culture,’ we are sympathetic to the emphasis cultural anthropologists Pant and Alberti 
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(1997) give to the pervasiveness and process-oriented aspects of ‘culture’. They viewed 
culture as an ‘ongoing open-ended process’ that shapes ‘the interplay of interpersonal 
interactions, biophysical endowments, material situation, social factors and interior 
dynamism such as values and conscience’ (p. 4). 
In the safety science literature, Edwards et al. (2013, p. 77) define ‘safety culture’ 
as:  
… the assembly of underlying assumptions, beliefs, values and attitudes shared by members of an 
organisation, which interact with an organisation’s structures and systems and the broader 
contextual setting to result in those external, readily-visible, practices that inﬂuence safety.  
 
They elaborate three conceptualizations of ‘safety culture.’ First, their anthropological 
conceptualization views safety-related outcomes as emerging from ‘shared beliefs and 
values’. Second, a normative conceptualization views safety culture as emerging 
principally from organizational and management level structures, systems and policies. 
Third, a pragmatic conceptualization recognized the importance of relating ‘beliefs, 
attitudes, values and contextual factors … directly to practices which inﬂuence safety’ 
(Edwards et al. 2013, p. 77, italics applied) 
None of the preceding definitions is completely persuasive or encompassing. 
Nonetheless, we draw from them to propose a tentative definition of ‘safety culture’ that 
has many of their elements – and which accords CEO-speak a critical role. We regard 
safety culture as  
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… the ongoing construction of underlying assumptions, beliefs, values and attitudes shared by 
members of an organization in moving to an environment characterized by a quest for an absence of 
harm. 
 
We focus on the safety discourse of a corporate leader of a global corporation. 
Thus, our standpoint on ‘safety culture’ is positioned, from a social constructionist 
perspective, within literature that acknowledges differentiated logics, power and ethics 
of a global organization. In the safety science literature, Blazsin and Guldenmund 
(2015) focused attention on the safety culture of ‘a big gas distribution company’ from 
such a perspective. Although the company they studied was not global (thus, unlike 
BP), it was sufficiently large and differentiated that ‘a multiplication of realities is 
generated, reducing the intelligibility and the rhetorical efficacy of the singular “voice 
from the top”’ (Gergen, 2001, p. 142). This ‘multiplication of realities’ seems to have 
been even more pronounced in BP, because it is a huge global organization.  
Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) model of ‘cultural development as a continuous 
cycle’ is adapted by Blazsin and Guldenmund (2015, p.18) in their discussion of safety 
culture. They argue that ‘sensemaking and simultaneous construction of reality appear 
as ongoing, dynamic, never-ending processes’ (p. 18), characterized by four recurring 
stages: 
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1. ‘Experimentation.’ This involves ‘Individual perceptions of reality and sensemaking.’ 
Individuals (as sensemakers) perceive ‘what … is risky and safe behavior.’ 
2. ‘Interaction.’ This involves ‘Mutual adjustment of perceptions … development of 
standard behaviours and understandings’. The focus is on ‘objectivations of subjective 
process (and meanings) by which the intersubjective commonsense world is 
constructed’ (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 33). Interaction results in the development 
of a safety culture that has ‘shared understandings, such as standards of behavior, 
roles and norms (Blazsin and Guldenmund, 2015, p. 18). 
3. ‘Institutionalization.’ This involves ‘Establishment of norms, institutionalization of 
behavior and expectations’, so that ‘the reality of everyday life becomes…objectified’ 
(Berger and Luckmann (1966, p. 35). This is represented in a safety context by ‘the 
formal processing of standards and norms…’ (Blazsin and Guldemend (2015, p. 18). 
4. ‘Internalization.’ This involves ‘Basic assumptions, agreement over the best (only) 
way of doing things.’ This stage is characterized by ‘Members of the group shar[ing] a 
comparable understanding of … the part of reality the group acts on’ (p. 18).  
A large, global enterprise such as BP has numerous ‘groups’ of people engaged in 
heterogeneous work, with widely different degrees of safety risk. These risks arise, in 
part, because of heterogeneous already-existing legacy cultures from the broader 
societies in which they operate, and from the legacy cultures of companies which BP 
has acquired. As a consequence, the social construction of a unitary, organization-wide 
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safety culture is rendered problematic. We are concerned to understand, critically, how 
the top leadership of such a global enterprise adds to, or detracts from, at least partly, 
the social construction of safety culture. In this, we expect management control 
mechanisms (such as budgets and compensation incentives) to influence ‘individual 
perceptions of reality and sensemaking’ regarding safety (Blazsin and Guldenmund, 
2015, p. 18). However, the safety discourse of corporate leadership (insofar as it 
influences such management control mechanisms) is important too.   
We draw on the triptych of metaphor, ideology, and rhetoric (discussed below) to 
critically interrogate the safety discourse in the CEO-speak of top management at BP. 
Amernic and Craig (2001) elaborate on the deployment of aspects of this triptych in 
interrogating CEO discourse.  
 
2.2 Metaphor, ideology and rhetoric 
Tinker (1996, p. 365) noted that ‘certain metaphors transport especially powerful 
biases, because of the way they camouflage the social underpinnings of the reality to 
which they refer’. Such camouflaging by ‘certain metaphors’ creates fertile ground for 
the notion that ideology comprises abstractions and ideas that ‘men and women live by, 
and will occasionally die for’ (Eagleton 1991, p. xiii). In a similar vein, Fairclough asserts 
that ‘different metaphors have different ideological attachments’ (1992, p. 100). Thus, 
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the ideas of metaphor and ideology are linked in a way which, at times, may be 
conscious, and at other times, less-than-conscious.  
In response to a self-posed question, ‘What is ideology?’ Eagleton (1991, p. 1) 
declared that ‘nobody has yet come up with a single adequate definition of ideology.’ He 
catalogues numerous ‘definitions of ideology currently in circulation’ (p. 1). A descriptive 
exploration of ideology emphasizes ‘sensemaking’ (Weick, 1995). Critical approaches to 
exploration of ideology (of the type we engage in) emphasize questions such as those 
proffered by Lye (2008, unpaginated, with some slight abridgement):  
Question 1: What are the assumptions about what is natural, just and right?  
Question 2: What (and who) do these assumptions distort or obscure?  
Question 3: What are the power relations? How are they made to appear as if they are normal or 
good? What negative aspects are excluded?  
Question 4: Which of the binary oppositions (good/evil, natural/unnatural, tame/wild, young/old) is 
privileged; and what is repressed or devalued by this privileging? 
Question 5: What people, classes, areas of life, experiences, are ‘left out’, silenced?  
Question 6: What cultural assumptions, and what ‘myths’ [or broad cultural meaning] shape 
experience and evaluation? 
Question 7: What enthymemes [statements which exclude the expression of key assumptions which 
ground conclusions] can you see in the ‘logic’ of the text?  
Question 8: How does the style of presentation contribute to the logic of the text?  
Question 9: What ‘utopic kernel’, that is, vision of human possibility, appears to lie at the heart of the 
understanding of the ideology?  
 
Lye’s questions are invoked opportunistically in assessing ideology in Hayward’s 
speech. We recognize that ideology can exist at many levels (such as meta and micro). 
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Accordingly, we use synonyms for ideology (such as idea, credo, ethos) in our 
analysis.2 
The third component of our linked analytical perspective, rhetoric, is informed by 
Lanham’s elaboration: 
We have in the West a venerable tradition of studying how human attention is created and allocated: 
the ‘art of persuasion’ which the Greeks called rhetoric. A better definition of rhetoric, in fact, might 
be ‘the economics of human attention-structures,’ for whenever we ‘persuade’ someone, we do so by 
getting that person to ‘look at things from our point of view,’ share our attention-structure. It is the 
nature of human life that attention should be in short supply, but in an information economy it 
becomes the crucial scarce commodity. Just as economics has been the study of how we allocate 
scarce resources in a goods economy, we now will use a variety of rhetoric as the ‘economics’ of 
human attention-structures. (Lanham, 1993, p. 227; see also Lanham [2006]).  
 
We regard metaphor3 to be the lynchpin of the tryptich of metaphor, rhetoric and 
ideology. Metaphor has the potential to camouflage ideology and its at-times potency in 
imposing (or at least encouraging) the sharing of ‘attention-structures.’ The power of 
                                                          
2 A focus on metaphor is consistent with a wide range of literature, especially (but not solely) that of Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980). Even before this highly influential book, scholarship acknowledged the central role of metaphor. 
For example, Landau (1961, p. 351) contended that: ‘…where a metaphor is dominant, it is a very powerful 
instrument. It structures inquiry, establishes relevance, and provides an interpretive system,’  thus contributing to 
the construction of ideology. 
3 Readers sharing a reviewer’s concern about the‘thinness of exegesis within the social sciences’ regarding 
metaphor, and the ‘extensive and philosophically profound work with metaphor… outside of the social sciences’, 
should consult Ricoeur’s ‘The Rule of Metaphor’ ( first English edition, 1977, bUniversity of Toronto Press, Toronto, 
ON). 
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metaphor is often nuanced and ‘below the radar’ of consciousness. Its power has been 
addressed in a variety of social settings: for example, in Nazi discourse (Harrington, 
1995); in deciphering tacit aspects of narrative in organizational research (Steger, 
2007), and in accounting-related discourse (Thornton, 1988; Walters-York, 1996; 
Amernic and Craig, 2009; Young, 2013). The analysis of metaphor is approachable in a 
variety of ways. These include focusing on individual instances of metaphor in a text or 
alternatively focusing on an underlying metaphoric structure of a text. We adopt both 
approaches, particularly since the instantiation of individual metaphors can assist in 
recognizing the extended metaphoric structure of an entire text. 
Werth (1994, p. 79) comments on what he terms a ‘metaphorical ‘undercurrent’ of a 
text: 
Most linguistic approaches to metaphor provide sentence-level accounts of the phenomenon. But 
literary metaphor is frequently discursive: there is an entire metaphorical ‘undercurrent’ running 
through a whole text, which may manifest itself in a large number and variety of ‘single’ metaphors. 
 
Blain’s (1988, p. 263) analysis of the second volume of Hitler’s Mein Kampf highlighted 
an underlying metaphor that seemingly ‘organized’ the entire text. Blain concluded that 
‘text seems to have been organized around a metaphor of a medical diagnosis and 
cure, a religious rite of guilt and redemption, and a drama of murder/revenge’ (p. 265). 
As another example, Oswald and Rihs (2014) demonstrate the importance of extended 
metaphor in political discourse. 
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Thus, an underlying metaphor (or related metaphors) can frame what seems to be 
the ‘natural’ or ‘obvious’ way of talking, speaking, and writing about a topic, including 
identifying its problems and solutions (Schön, 1993).4 For example, in his study of U.S. 
policy towards Cuba, Pérez (2008) provides extensive examples to support his 
contention that a limited set of pervasive and relatively constant metaphors (such as 
CUBA IS A WOMAN, a damsel in distress) were articulated by U.S. policymakers to 
justify their actions over many years. Pérez (2008, p. 36) contends that with respect to 
Cuba, ‘Metaphorical constructs provided a normative grounding for a version of reality 
and validation of conduct.’ 
Thus, metaphor, ideology and rhetoric are intertwined analytical perspectives that 
can be used to interrogate the speech of BP’s CEO to its AGM in 2010. When viewed 
as linguistic means of contributing to the (social) construction of our previously-asserted 
definition of ‘safety culture’,5 this triptych supports the importance of metaphor (and 
                                                          
4 This conception of the metaphoric structure of a text can be linked more broadly to the phenomenon of 
‘discourse’ which we do not pursue explicitly here. ‘Discourse’ is a justly contested word. It can be viewed as a 
collection of interconnected texts and customs ‘that systematically form the objects of which they speak’ 
(Foucault, 1979, p. 49). Phillips et al. (2004) distinguish a ‘dominant’ discourse as one so widely shared that it 
becomes the default way of talking, speaking, writing, and thinking about a phenomenon. Ricoeur (2016/1981) 
explores the distinction between language and discourse in creative depth. He develops the idea that ‘It is as 
discourse that language is either spoken or written’ (p. 159). 
 
5 That is, ‘the ongoing construction of underlying assumptions, beliefs, values and attitudes shared by members of 
an organization in moving to an environment characterized by a quest for an absence of harm.’ 
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underlying metaphor) as a way of assessing the extent to which BP’s CEO-speak 
contributed to, or detracted from, the company’s safety culture.  
 
3. BP’s context at the time of the Deepwater Horizon disaster 
3.1 BP’s context before and at the time of the 2010 AGM speech 
     Scheff (1997) emphasized the importance of context in interpreting text, whilst 
acknowledging the impracticality of ‘locat[ing] all relevant context’ (p. 28). In the 
following subsections, we document BP’s context of unlearned safety lessons, the over-
riding contextual influence of CEO-speak in constructing safety culture in a company 
such as BP, the shared ownership environment in which the Deepwater Horizon oil 
platform functioned, and the specific contextual importance of an AGM.  
 
3.2 BP’s context of unlearned safety lessons 
Most people would expect that large, mature and complex companies engaged in 
high risk operations (such as BP) ensured they had a strong safety culture. However, 
safety culture was apparently problematic at BP at the time of the Deepwater Horizon 
explosion. BP had sustained several major safety crises in the preceding decade: a 
major oil spill at Prudhoe Bay, Alaska in 2006; and a refinery explosion that killed 15 
workers at Texas City, Texas in 2005. BP had sustained many lesser reportable safety 
breaches too. The company was prompted to commission a safety review of the 2005 
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Texas City tragedy (Report of the BP US Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel, 
January, 2007, hereafter referred to as the Baker Report: accessible at www.bp.com).  
Not surprisingly, a few months after the April 20 Deepwater Horizon explosion, in 
July 2010, Tony Hayward’s replacement as CEO, Robert (Bob) Dudley, acknowledged 
publicly that BP did not have an adequate safety culture prior to April 20, 2010, and that 
things had to be ‘shake[n] up’ (Crooks, 2010). BP’s safety history gave Dudley good 
grounds for such a stance. For example, in assessing the causes of the 2005 explosion 
of BP’s Texas City plant, the Baker Report (2007, p. xii) expressed strong concern 
about BP’s lack of leadership in setting ‘… the process safety “tone at the top” of the 
organization and establish[ing] appropriate expectations regarding process safety 
performance …’ The expression ‘safety culture’ appeared 382 times in the Baker Report. 
Consequently, BP’s board of directors and top management (and plausibly most people 
affiliated formally or informally with BP) are likely to have been aware in 2007 of the 
Baker Report’s severe and detailed rebuke of BP for having a deficient safety culture. 
BP was admonished at the time in the report of the U.S. Chemical Safety and 
Hazard Investigation Board [CSB] on the Texas City refinery explosion. In respect of 
BP’s safety culture, the CSB concluded that: 
 
The BP Texas City tragedy is an accident with organizational causes embedded in the refinery’s 
culture … 
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    • BP Texas City lacked a reporting and learning culture. Reporting bad news was not encouraged, 
and often Texas City managers did not effectively investigate incidents or take appropriate corrective 
action.  
    • BP Group lacked focus on controlling major hazard risk. BP management paid attention to, 
measured, and rewarded personal safety rather than process safety.  
    • BP Group and Texas City managers provided ineffective leadership and oversight. BP 
management did not implement adequate safety oversight … (CSB 2007, p. 179).  
 
The lessons from the 2005 Texas City explosion and many other safety crises at BP 
had not permeated the company at the time of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster. 
According to Steffy: 
 
Despite Hayward’s vow to make safety a priority, and despite all the proclamations of the ‘new BP’ 
… its management structure was still convoluted, accountability was hard to find, decisions were 
made by committee, and cost cutting and financial performance continued to overshadow operations 
… (2011, p. 160). 
Support for Steffy’s assessment is provided in the opening statement of William K. 
Reilly, co-chair of the U.S. National Commission on the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and 
Offshore Drilling, to that Commission on November 9, 2010:  
 
We know a safety culture must be led from the top and permeate a company. The Commission is 
looking beyond the rig, and not just to yesterday and what happened on April 20th, but to the months 
and years that preceded it. BP has been notoriously challenged on matters of process safety… 
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Other companies may not be so challenged (Reilly 2010, p. 9, lines 14-20, transcript, Day 2 of fifth 
meeting).  
 
Farley, a lawyer assisting the Baker panel, recommended that one of the ‘core 
elements for a successful safety culture’ was the adoption of ‘… the right tone at the 
top.’ He made it clear that ‘safety’ is a core value and involves sending a highly visible 
message, beginning with the board and continuing down the line. Upper management 
must then ‘walk that talk’’ (Sissell 2010, p. 39). This emphasizes the strong potential for 
CEO-speak to help construct ‘the right tone at the top’ and to enshrine safety as an 
ongoing, core organizational value — a matter we address in the following subsection. 
 
3.3 The role of CEO-speak in discursive construction of a safety culture 
CEOs of large, complex, risky organizations have a pivotal influence on safety 
issues because of their rhetorical contribution to discourses on safety culture. Thus, 
CEO-speak is potentially a central formative element in developing a safety culture. The 
language of CEOs can be conceptualised as anthropological because of its importance 
in propagating and enabling ‘shared beliefs and values’ (an ideology) relating to safety 
(Edwards et al., 2013). Such a view is consistent with Schein’s (2004, p. 225) 
contention that ‘Culture is created by shared experience, but it is the leader who initiates 
this process by imposing his or her beliefs, values, and assumptions…’ CEO-speak is a 
primary means of such imposition. 
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CEO speeches and other discourse opportunities can also reflect a normative 
conceptualization of safety culture (Edwards et al., 2013). This is because of the 
potential for CEOs to talk and write about safety and various structures, systems and 
policies (for example, by favorably describing management incentive schemes that 
reward safe behavior). As well, CEOs are often pragmatic in talking and writing about 
specific practices that are designed to enable safety (Edwards et al., 2013). The 
earnestness and clarity of such talking and writing indicates whether safety is an 
‘overriding commitment’ (Hopkins, 2006, p. 876). Also important is the ‘vocabulary of 
safety leading’ (Ocasio, 2005): that is, the interrelated set of words used to guide 
organizational communications by the CEO regarding known and unknown risks and 
danger (such as with respect to BP’s hydrocarbon exploration, extraction, 
transportation, and distribution activities). 
Thus, the written and verbal language of a CEO has strong potential to affect 
various dimensions of the ongoing construction (or destruction) of a safety culture. 
Through their discourse, CEOs should endeavor to create a climate in which their 
organization actively develops a safety culture mindset. They should encourage strong 
aspirations to achieve an ‘absence of harm’ environment (for persons inside and outside 
the organization). The ‘tone at the top’ that CEO-speak renders has strong potential to 
reinforce a safety consciousness mindset and a commitment to the idea of movement 
towards the absence of harm.  
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3.4 Safety in a shared environment  
At the time of the Deepwater Horizon explosion, the drilling vessel was owned by 
another company (Transocean). Key functions were performed by other companies 
(e.g., Halliburton). Nonetheless, in such a high-risk shared environment it was clear that 
BP (as the operator of the platform and dominant player) would bear the primary portion 
of risk, and thus be the primary responsible party for ensuring safety.6  
 
3.5 Importance of the CEO’s AGM speech  
An AGM is ‘an essential aspect of corporate governance’ (Apostolides, 2010, p.140). It 
provides an ‘opportunity to communicate directly with all shareholders …the whole 
Board attends … and is available to answer questions from shareholders present’ 
(Tesco Annual Report, 2008, p. 24). However, shareholders are only one of many 
groups interested in the speech of the CEO of a large, risky and complex organization 
                                                          
6 Evidence supporting such a view is provided by Tony Hayward’s deposition for the trial held in the New Orleans 
U.S. District Court regarding the explosion. The following exchange took place between Hayward and Roberts, his 
interrogator (pp. 558-559, Hayward Deposition, http://www.mdl2179trialdocs.com):  
 
 
  
Roberts: In general, what was the industry allocation of environmental risk between an Operator such as 
BP and subcontractors who worked for the Operator while drilling wells for the Operator? 
Hayward: The industry norm would be, in most circumstances, that the Operator would take that risk. 
 
The responsibility of BP in the specific instance of Deepwater Horizon is also evident in the September 4, 2014 
finding of Judge Barbier in the US District Court (Eastern District of Louisianna). Barbier found that BP was 
grossly negligent in the disaster, and even under the restrictive rules of general maritime law, BP was 67% 
responsible (Gilbert and Scheck, 2014).  
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delivers at the AGM. A range of other stakeholder groups (including employees, unions, 
activists, competitors, and the public-at-large) also are attentive to the words of the CEO 
in the high-profile setting. The CEO’s speech at an AGM should be recognised as an 
integral part of what makes an AGM ‘a primary vehicle for perpetuating … corporate 
culture’ (Schneider, 1998, p. 294). 
In presenting a speech to the AGM, a CEO can help stakeholders construct 
meaning by identifying, labeling, and organizing phenomena (such as events and 
ideas), including strategies and performance measures (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007). 
Whatever the CEO includes (or excludes) in the AGM speech deserves to be noticed. 
The speech is not merely a ritual. It is ‘a powerful setting for accountability’ (Catasús 
and Johed, 2007, p. 173). Thus, speech transcripts are an important artifact that can 
provide insight to an organization’s safety culture (Guldenmund, 2000, pp. 251-2).7  
The 2010 AGM speech delivered by Hayward was his third such speech. Thus, he 
was a relatively seasoned CEO when this speech was crafted and delivered. It offers 
potential to understand leadership-through-language, particularly with respect to safety 
matters, and to assess whether Hayward contributed positively or negatively to the 
ongoing construction of BP’s safety culture.  
Since we analyse Hayward’s AGM speech as a means of better understanding 
safety culture at BP, additional justification is proffered to sustain our decision for such a 
                                                          
7 We do not analyse aspects of the physical delivery of a speech (gestures, intonation, use of visual aids). 
Weacknowledge that they are also critical to a complete understanding (Palaima, 2009). 
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focus. We are mindful of the comment of an anonymous reviewer that ‘private or 
internal discourse, or at least public discourse targeted to other/additional audiences 
perhaps [might be] more appropriate for this analysis.’ Notwithstanding that all of these 
examples of other ‘discourse’ genres are likely to be appropriate, we contend that the 
AGM speech is at least as apt (if not even more so), for gaining insight to the social 
construction of a company’s safety culture. This is so since the CEO’s speech to the 
AGM of a large, multinational company pursuing risky endeavors (such as BP) has the 
following attributes: 
- it  is delivered at the AGM, a high-profile setting, watched by various media and 
others, including other stakeholders;  
- it is delivered by the CEO, the most important leader of the company; 
-the CEO is often the ‘face’ of the company to the outside world; and 
-the CEO is also the ‘face’ of the company to the many heterogeneous 
constituencies within the company. 
Porter and Nohria’s (2010) study of the CEO’s role in large, complex organizations, 
captures the importance of CEO language. They claim that ‘…the CEO’s job is 
inherently one of communication…’ (p. 464). Because of the importance of the 
discourse setting in which it takes place, the CEO’s communication at the AGM is 
plausibly one of the pinnacle aspects of the CEO’s ‘job.’ We that other external and 
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internal discourses would, in other research, provide important additional insights to 
corporate leadership. 
  
4. Method and data 
We reviewed the 18 public speeches Hayward delivered as CEO of BP before BP’s 
2010 AGM. These provide context for a more intensive examination of his speech to the 
2010 AGM. His 18 prior public speeches are insightful since ‘the speaker’s life, insofar 
as it is public, forms a long prelude to his speech’ (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 
1958, p. 320). Appendix A summarises the date, title, venue, and number of words in 
each of Hayward’s 18 prior speeches. We also briefly examined the text of the 125 
speeches presented by Hayward’s predecessor as CEO of BP, Lord Browne of 
Madingley. 
Examination of Hayward’s 18 prior speeches focuses initially on the keyword 
‘safety.’ We also investigate whether the keyword ‘culture’ is used in the context of 
safety. Both of these keywords have significant rhetorical potency (Hart et al., 2005; 
Williams, 1976). The use of these keywords by a CEO helps discursively to construct a 
large, complex and risky organization’s safety culture, and to indicate that a safety 
culture is a desired organizational state. As Guldenmund (2000, p. 252) points out, it is 
a ‘good sign’ if ‘references to safety’ are made to be among the ‘basic assumptions of 
  24 
an organization.’ Guldenmund’s corollary is that when ‘such references cannot be found 
there is insufficient evidence to conclude that a safety culture exists’ (2000, p. 252). 
Guldenmund’s claims regarding use of the words ‘safety’ and ‘culture’ do not 
necessarily mean that safety culture is, as we suggest, a ‘desired organizational state’ 
but that the terms are simply being used strategically. However, support for our stance 
is provided by Tucker et al. (2016). They report recent evidence that CEOs indirectly, 
but importantly, influence safety ‘by fostering a safety climate in the TMT [top 
management team] that then trickles down to lower levels in the organization’ (p. 1234). 
We submit that Hayward’s use of the keywords ‘safety’ and ‘culture’ in his 18 prior 
speeches is a necessary but insufficient indicator of a ‘safety culture’. 
In analyzing the 2010 AGM speech, we viewed metaphor as being intertwined with 
rhetoric and ideology. We are alert to the challenges involved in exploring metaphor in 
the speech. a prominent contributor to the metaphor literature, Gibbs, highlights the 
need for caution :  
 
‘… counting metaphors … do[es] not tell us much about the degree of metaphoricity within any word 
or longer stretch of discourse. Moreover, even a single verbal metaphor can provide structure for an 
entire discourse where the main metaphorical theme is elaborated upon through nonmetaphorical 
language. There are also many occasions in which the entailments of underlying conceptual 
metaphors … reflect a metaphorical conception of some idea despite the fact that the language 
giving evidence of this is not metaphorical … there may be few instances of verbal metaphor yet the 
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main ideas communicated still express an overall metaphorical understanding of some idea or event 
(2015, p. 175). 
 
Mindful of the above, we do not overemphasize ‘linguistic instances of a metaphor, 
while overlooking the importance of the logic of the metaphor in the context of the 
passage” (Rohrer and Vignone, 2012, p.13).  
The 2010 AGM speech was examined by both authors using a close reading 
approach. As with Amernic and Craig (2006, p.6), the transcript was subjected 
 
… to multiple (usually three) close readings, conducted from different (but mutually reinforcing) 
perspectives. Each close reading constitute[d] an intensive, almost forensic, scrutiny of the explicit 
and implicit composition of the text … typically … one close reading for ideology, one for rhetoric, 
and another for metaphor. 
 
Each author separately read the text of the speech several times, making working 
notes. These were exchanged, reviewed, and a consensus was developed over several 
iterations of this process. Readers should acknowledge that close reading methods are 
interpretive and not  limited by the capacity of close readers to contextualize and 
interpret ‘words on a page’ in an unbiased fashion. Thus, whilst an interpretive process 
can produce many useful insights, it can also lead to contestable conclusions because 
of the complexity of a social phenomenon and a ‘plurality of plausible explanations’ 
  26 
(Ron, 2008, p. 291). We do not claim that the explanations we offer are necessarily 
unique or better than some others. Since knowledge of the social world is constructed 
socially, the views we present are a matter of intersubjective agreement; and the 
resulting knowledge is an interpretation which is subject to social controls, criticism by 
peers, and social (re)-negotiation (Blaikie, 2007).  
In Appendix B, we reproduce Hayward’s speech to BP’s AGM held on April 15, 
2010, in London. The speech comprised 2323 words. Line numbers have been added 
to facilitate analysis. Our multiple close readings of this speech involved slowing down 
the reading process in a search for implicit assumptions, ideology, silences, techniques 
of argumentation, and important cognitive features, such as metaphor. This involved 
carefully re-reading sentences and paragraphs; exploring the sequence and frequency 
with which ideas and words were used; reading complex text phrase-by-phrase to 
discern meaning; and reflecting on how various facts, text or arguments co-relate. As 
we read text, we marked passages where appropriate, investigated the meaning of 
individual words, looked for apt and inapt juxtapositions, and sought insights to authorial 
intent. Like Slagell (1991, p. 156), we sought to understand the ‘inner workings’ of text. 
Our particular intent was to study how the tryptich of metaphor, rhetoric and ideology 
constructed meaning in terms of safety. 
We focus on the parts of Hayward’s 2010 AGM speech in which he refers directly 
and indirectly to safety. We were aware of BP’s poor safety track record at the time of 
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the speech, and the company’s alleged renewed concern for safety. Thus, we expected 
to observe strong explicit mentions (and subtle implicit instances) of espoused values 
and attitudes regarding safety. We also expected to find strong ‘secondary articulation 
and reinforcement mechanisms’ (Schein, 2004) ─ such as safety-related aspects of 
organizational design, systems, procedures and rituals; and some formal statement of 
organizational philosophy or creed relating to safety.  
We present results in the sequence in which associated text occurs. We do not 
cluster results into identifiable themes or discourse features (such as metaphors, 
silences, implicit assumptions). Our decision to opt for the former approach is consistent 
with many similar studies (for example, Slagell, 1991; Amernic and Craig, 2013) and is 
based on belief that sequence of narrative is critical in making sense of text.  
 
5. Results 
5.1 Speeches of Hayward and Brown prior to the 2010 AGM 
The word ‘safety’ appears only 17 times in Hayward’s 18 speeches prior to his 2010 
AGM speech. (For details of these speeches see Appendix A). The incidence of the 
word ‘safety’ is low considering BP’s longstanding poor safety history. Thus, there is 
little support for the notion that the tone at the top was engaged actively in a normative 
discourse to promote a safety culture. For example, Hayward mentions ‘safe(ty)’ in 
referring to a corporate project (speech #3); safe(ty) (of) oil supplies (speeches #4 and 
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#18); and the title of a BP report (speech #10). The word ‘culture’ appears only four 
times in Hayward’s public speeches. Each use is bereft of any link to safety. 
These results are not surprising given that Hayward’s predecessor as CEO of BP, 
Lord Browne of Madingly, used the word ‘safety’ only 56 times, and the word ‘safe’ only 
15 times, in the 332,847 words comprising his 125 available public speeches during his 
tenure as CEO from 19 May 1997 to 26 April 2007. (These speeches were downloaded 
from the BP website, www.bp.com, in 2007). In contrast, Browne used the word ‘cost’ 
224 times: that is, 15 times more often than ‘safe(ty)’. Browne used ‘culture’ 39 times, 
but in ways unassociated with safety or with words related to safety.  
 
5.2 Close reading of CEO Hayward’s 2010 AGM speech 
We present the results of our analysis of CEO Hayward’s 2010 AGM speech in 
twenty ‘observations.’ These are arranged sequentially, based upon the text of the 
speech. Our close analysis of text begins with lines 62-66. We use the acronym TH to 
refer to Tony Hayward.  
 
Lines 62-66 
 
Our priorities which lie at the heart of all our operations remain safety, people 
and performance. This is what we call our Forward Agenda. Our focus on 
safe and reliable operations is now strongly embedded in all our businesses; 
we are continuing to build the on [sic] the core capabilities of our people; and 
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we have started to see the benefits of improved operational performance 
flowing through to the bottom line. 
 
Observation #1. Safety, people, and performance are said to be positioned ‘at the heart 
of all our operations.’ The ‘heart’ metaphor evokes emotion, emphasizes the centrality 
of safety, people and performance, and is an astute rhetorical move. Hayward’s mention 
of ‘safety’ before ‘people’ and ‘performance’ seems to be a positive indicator of the 
rhetorical construction of a safety culture (consistent with Guldenmund, 2000, p. 252, 
and our earlier discussion). The use of the modifier ‘remain’ implies that that such 
importance was always the case and continues to be so. However, the use of ‘now’ in 
‘Our focus on safe and reliable operations is now strongly embedded in all our 
businesses…’ implies that the ‘focus on safe and reliable operations’ was perhaps not 
‘strongly embedded’ previously. So, we have an inconsistency between the words 
‘remain’ and ‘now.’ Furthermore, by listing ‘safety’, ‘people’, and ‘performance’ 
separately, TH apparently regards safety as a separate, perhaps compartmentalised 
construct. This is inconsistent with the view that safety culture is an ‘integral constituent’ 
of an organization’s culture (Haukelid, 2008, p. 417). In Lye’s (2008) terminology 
regarding ideology, TH’s apparent compartmentalizing is an assumption ‘about what is 
natural, just and right.’ 
Further, who are the ‘people’ to whom TH refers? Are all people, including all 
possible stakeholders in BP (including those who might have their lives ruined or at 
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least disrupted by the company’s operating activities)? Or are they restricted to 
shareholders and (perhaps) employees? Lye’s (2008) question 5 regarding “What 
people…are ‘left out’’, seems apt here.  
 
Observation #2. TH tells us that ‘our focus [is] on safe and reliable operations.’ 
However, the many focuses noted by TH in the speech dilute the rhetorical 
effectiveness of the word ‘focus’. In lines 85-86 for example, we are told BP is ‘focusing 
on deepening our capability by putting the right people with the right skills in the right 
place.’ In lines 113-114, the ‘focus’ on ‘efficiency’ is a ‘steadfast’ one. The power of the 
adjective ‘steadfast’ suggests that ‘efficiency’ is a primary focus. But can such a focus 
on efficiency be reconciled with the ‘safe and reliable operations’ mentioned in line 63? 
Since the word ‘focus’ is metaphorical, and  implies a unitary directed attention, a 
complex multinational company such as BP must necessarily establish organizational 
infrastructure and management control systems to effect such multiple focuses in 
meaningful ways. But there is no mention of such systems in the speech. Use of a 
‘focus’ metaphor throughout the speech seems consistent with the  conception of 
rhetoric as sharing ‘attention-structure’ (Lanham, 1993). TH is telling his audience what 
is being focused upon, but glosses over the problematic nature of the focusing.  
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Observation #3. The metaphor of ‘building on the core capabilities of our people’ 
provides a bridge from Hayward’s ‘safe and reliable operations.’ It establishes a causal 
link with ‘the benefits of improved operational performance flowing through to the 
bottom line.’ Thus, safety is made rhetorically subservient to ‘improved operational 
performance.’ he ultimate criterion is apparently ‘the bottom line’ [profit performance]. 
According to Lye’s (2008) question 4, this indicates a privileged binary, ideologically. 
This chain of metaphors seems fundamentally at odds with the (absent) rhetorical 
construction of ‘safety culture.’ TH’s silence about the measurement and ‘benefits’ of 
‘improved operational performance’ is an implied call for faith in what he says. 
‘Improved operational performance’ evokes an engineering perspective. The metaphors 
in the phrase ‘and we have started to see the benefits of improved operational 
performance flowing through to the bottom line’ intriguingly include the construct of 
‘flowing through’.  
Lines 62-66, overall, offer tepid support for Edwards et al.’s (2013) anthropological 
conceptualization of ‘safety culture,’ In which safety-related outcomes are regarded as 
emerging from ‘shared beliefs and values’ (p. 77). 
 
Lines 70-73 
 
Safety remains our number one priority and I’m pleased to report we can see clear 
progress. There has been a significant reduction in the frequency of recordable 
  32 
injuries and the number of major incidents related to integrity failures has also 
fallen. At the same time we’re reducing containment losses in our operations. 
 
Observation #4. Even though it is alleged that ‘safety remains our number one priority’, 
the criteria for ‘we can see clear progress’ are based solely on implied output measures. 
A comparison of the facts provided regarding safety, and the facts reported later in the 
speech in respect of financial performance, is telling. Hayward cites 24 performance 
measures in his AGM speech (see Table 1, below). However, only one of these 
(‘recordable injuries’, line 71) refers to safety. This sits oddly with the foundation 
concepts of safety culture suggested by Silbey (2009) and Antonsen (2009). There are 
many questions TH might reasonably have been expected to touch upon. Is safety 
genuinely better? Is there a culture of operational safety exemplified by safety meetings, 
and rewards for safety improvement suggestions? How is safety embedded in 
employee compensation systems? What influences on safety did the Baker Report and 
other reports have? Is the ‘significant reduction’ significant in a statistical sense? What 
does ‘integrity failure’ mean here? 
From the perspective of Lye’s (2008) question 1, lines 70-73 imply that it is ‘natural, 
just and right’ to assume safety is a construct that can be largely monitored and 
measured by reductionist output indicators. Such indicators, if well-designed, are 
important, and should function within a safety culture (Edwards et al., 2013). 
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Observation #5. Safety is identified as ‘our number one priority.’ Paradoxically, the word 
‘safety’ is used only twice in the entire 2323 words of the speech. The text is dominated 
by statements concerning financial matters and organizational efficiency. How can 
safety be ‘our number one priority’ when it merits only two mentions, and implies a 
simple view of such a complex concept? TH focuses instead on the financial numbers, 
and the importance of driving down costs. The emphasis on non-safety performance 
measures is evident in the summary in Table 1 of the various financial and other (non-
safety) performance measures TH refers to: 
Table 1 
Performance Measures in Hayward’s Speech as CEO to BP’s AGM on 15 April 2010 
Performance measure Line number(s) in speech 
(reproduced in Appendix B) 
cost(s) 42, 54, 105, 106, 108, 109, 132 
investment 46 
cash flow 52 
recordable injuries 71 
number of major incidents related to integrity failures 71-72 
containment losses 73 
matching people, skills, places 85-86 
competitive gap 95 
efficiency 103, 107, 114, 189, 199, 202, 207 
refining margins 112 
reserves replacement 125, 126, 173-174 
production growth 127, 159, 161 
headcount 135 
new (oil) resources, projects 156, 164 
larger, advantaged refineries 179-180 
supply optimisation capability 181 
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earnings (return on capital) versus peers 188-189 
value chain/supply chain performance  107, 190 
upstream project execution 191 
safe and reliable operations 199-200 
clearer accountabilities 203 
standard designs and equipment 204 
new culture 210-211 
costs, capital efficiency and margin quality 215-216 
 
Throughout the speech, there is an apparent privileging of financial performance over 
safety. This is evident in the overwhelming preponderance of accounting-based and 
similar performance measures, and the failure to acknowledge the complexity of safety 
culture as an evolving and ongoing organizational challenge.  
Observation #6. If cost cutting is an over-arching objective as our reading concludes, 
some tangible justification should be offered regarding how ‘safety’ is improved, or at 
least maintained, as costs are cut and numerous other economic performance goals 
(listed above) are pursued. Such an explanation should reflect the nature of safety 
culture well beyond mere linkage to myopic metrics such as reportable incidents. TH’s 
pronounced emphasis on non-safety performance measures (as evidenced by the 
preponderance of financial and economic measures) focuses attention on shared 
beliefs and values other than safety culture. Thus, Edwards et al.’s (2013) normative 
conceptualization of safety culture is poorly served, since TH emphasises performance 
measures other than safety. Indeed, the great challenge of improving safety whilst 
reducing costs is not addressed (Lye, 2008, question 5).  
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Lines 75-78 
 
We are continuing to improve our skills and capabilities as we roll out a common 
Operating Management System across our business. By the end of 2009 we'd fully 
implemented this at 70 sites - covering around 80 per cent of our operations and 
the remainder will be completed this year. 
 
Observation #7. The phrase ‘…fully implemented… at 70 sites…’ is the first 
achievement noted regarding the Operating Management System [OMS]. Near the end 
of the speech (lines 210-211), TH refers casually to ‘establishing’ a ‘new culture’ at BP. 
This is the first mention of culture in the entire speech. Yet, creating a new culture is a 
major challenge that requires substantial effort. Is the idea of instituting in a new culture 
consistent with such a casual mention? If the CEO refers to this new culture only in 
passing, what are the prospects it will be taken seriously by employees? TH does not 
say more about what this ‘new culture’ is supposed to be, and in what sense it differs 
from what went before. Indeed, from the perspectives of Pant and Alberti (1997), Schein 
(2004), and Edwards et al. (2013), the ‘new culture’ that TH mentions — which 
presumably includes the OMS as a major structural component — seems curiously 
unlike a safety culture. Given the numerous financial and economic performance 
measures mentioned, the apparent hiving-off of safety, and the mention of a safety 
metric (‘reportable incidents’) only once, this ‘new culture’ seems rhetorically and 
ideologically inconsistent with ‘safety culture.’  
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Lines 101-103 
 
The drive to increase efficiency and reduce costs remains a key focus for 
everyone at BP. We started more than two years ago in our effort to counter cost 
inflation and drive much greater efficiency into our business. 
 
Observation #8. The one word metaphor ‘drive’ appears six times, and ‘driving’ and 
‘driven’ once each in the speech. These uses provide some insight to TH’s approach to 
leadership. TH cannot conceivably know that ‘The drive to increase efficiency and 
reduce costs remains a key focus for everyone at BP.’ Although such hyperbole  is (as a 
reviewer of this paper observed), ‘a common aspect of strategic discourse’, it 
nevertheless suggests, at the very least, a desirable vision for TH as CEO. 
Indeed, as mentioned above, it is highly unlikely that a firm such as BP can 
simultaneously drive down costs and improve safety, especially without acknowledging 
the complexity of constructing a safety culture in which everyone in the company would 
have a common focus on greater safety at reduced risk (Blaszin and Guldenmund, 
2015). This presumes a unitary, mechanical corporate and organizational culture of a 
type that is unrealistic in a large global, high-risk company. This message from the top 
is likely to encourage fake feedback systems, such as were reported in Collinson’s 
(1999) study of North Sea oil companies. Further, the ‘drive’ metaphor is a root 
metaphor. It suggests that TH’s leadership is characterised by a relentless push to 
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increase efficiency and reduce costs. Such behavior is in many ways inconsistent with 
the construction of a safety culture. Overall, lines 101-103, along with other parts of the 
speech mentioned above, seem consistent with cultural assumptions (Lye, 2008, 
question 6) that are related to the omniscience of the company’s leadership (they 
seemingly know what ‘a key focus for everyone at BP’ is and they energize the ‘drive’). 
 
Observation #9. There are parallels with the ‘faster, better, cheaper’ organizational 
credo (or ideology) introduced at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
[NASA] in the early 1990s. This credo was implicated as a cause of the disintegration of 
the Columbia space shuttle during re-entry, and the death of seven crew members (see 
Ocasio, 2005). The apparent mentality reflected by Hayward (which seems to have 
constituted the managerial ethos at BP) was that oil drilling and refining were inherently 
and unavoidably risky operations; and, ‘while risks must be managed and mitigated, 
making [such activities] safer was not a priority’ (Ocasio, 2005, p. 108). Indeed, in terms 
of Ocasio’s (2005) notion of a ‘vocabulary of safety leading’, Hayward’s speech does 
not use any safety-related words such as ‘risk’, ‘hazard’, ‘maintenance’, ‘repair’, 
‘prevent’ or ‘accident.’ Lye’s (2008) question 5 regarding silences seems appropriate 
here. 
 
Lines 105-110 
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In the upstream we are leading our peer group in driving down production costs, 
with BP’s unit costs in 2009 12 per cent lower than in 2008. We will maintain this 
momentum through activity choice and in the way we manage the supply chain. In 
the downstream our efficiency initiatives have reduced cash costs by more than 15 
per cent in 2009 and our goal over the next 2 to 3 years is to return costs to 2004 
levels. For the group as a whole we reduced our cash costs last year by more than 
$4 billion. 
 
Observation #10. The stress on ‘driving down production costs’ suggests a compulsion, 
metaphorically. What is unsaid is how such ‘driving’ could be compatible with a safety 
culture or with enlightened Human Resource Management practices (Lye, 2008, 
question 5, among others). The claim that BP will ‘maintain this momentum through 
activity choice and in the way we manage the supply chain’ is a mechanistic 
prescription: an engineer’s view of the world of BP. Although cost management and 
economic efficiency are worthy goals, the totalizing rhetoric and ideology of TH’s CEO-
speak on these goals is confounding because it constrains the capacity of his ‘tone at 
the top’ to construct a safety culture. 
 Indeed, the 12 per cent reduction in BP’s unit production costs in just one year 
seems astounding. This is left as seemingly unproblematic in the speech (Lye, 2008, 
questions 1, 4 (lower cost is better?). Accountants and many others know that the word 
cost and its underlying concepts are far from straightforward. Yet, in TH’s speech, no 
hint of such complexity is evident. We acknowledge that in a high-level speech by the 
CEO, such inconvenient niceties are acknowledged rarely. However, the magnitude of 
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the reduction (12 per cent) deserves commentary. How was it accomplished? Did 
different production units have different unit cost reduction results? Cost is rendered 
rhetorically, and ideologically, unproblematic ─ as is the potential for organizational 
disruption and safety culture harm arising from such a sudden, large reduction.   
 
Lines 112-114 
 
In 2009, lower oil and gas prices and weak refining margins created a 
challenging environment for the whole sector. But the operational momentum in 
our business and our steadfast focus on efficiency has clearly improved our 
performance relative to our peers. 
 
Observation #11. All major oil companies faced ‘a challenging environment’ due to 
factors largely beyond their control (‘lower oil and gas prices and weak refining 
margins’). It is difficult to accept that the operational virtuosity displayed by BP (and 
evidently fashioned by TH and colleagues since 2007) ‘has clearly improved our 
performance relative to our peers’ (e.g., Shell, Texaco). We seem invited to believe that 
BP’s peers are less astute and possibly relatively inept. Perhaps ‘our peers’ didn’t drive 
down costs like BP, or match people and skills like BP? Perhaps ‘our peers’ are more 
design-safety conscious and better employers. Or perhaps the invocation of 
‘competitive talk’ and the performance of ‘peers’ is a way of ‘generating consent’ and 
‘discouraging potentially creative stakeholder conflict’ (Rasmussen, 2011, p. 474). Thus, 
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rhetorically, the implication is that the ‘focus on efficiency’ is acceptable, and virtuous, 
because of pressures imposed by the market and competitors.  
 
Observation #12. The word ‘momentum’, when allied with many uses of the word ‘drive’, 
reinforces the master JOURNEY metaphor. ‘Operational momentum’ is especially 
metaphoric in suggesting a large, unstoppable physical object. TH and colleagues in the 
‘refreshed’ top management team (line 84) seem to be claiming recognition for 
engineering an entity that can progress unimpeded. Additionally, the reference to ‘our 
performance’ (line 114) does not seem to include any aspect of safety culture. 
 
Lines 183-185 
 
However while our portfolio ranks amongst the best in the industry, our financial 
performance has yet to fully reflect this. There is now a real opportunity to make this 
portfolio work harder for us and we intend to do just that. 
 
Observation #13. The expression ‘a real opportunity to make this portfolio work harder 
for us’ seems to be a euphemism for ‘push operations and safety to the limit in the quest 
for profits.’ Who are the (unmentioned) people in ‘this portfolio’ (Lye, 2008)? TH seems 
to be thinking only of shareholders because the identity of ‘us’ seems apparent in the 
early framing of the speech. In line 9, TH states candidly that he wants BP to ‘… make 
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our asset base work harder for our shareholders.’8 Any CEO discourse which focuses 
narrowly on ‘shareholders’ is disingenuous, since the economic welfare of shareholders 
depends fundamentally on constructing and enabling a robust safety culture (particularly 
in a risky company such as BP).9 A recent empirical study concludes that ‘firm value 
appears to decline with injury rates’ (Cohn and Wardlaw, 2016, p. 2053), thereby 
suggesting a relationship between safety cultures and the economic welfare of 
shareholders. 
The use of the apparent metaphor ‘portfolio’ seems consistent with an ideology that 
views a company through the lens of corporate finance (Lye, 2008, questions 1, 2). 
Such a metaphor obscures the complexity and humanity of any business, especially 
one such as BP. Rhetorically, it seems to signal that BP’s leadership adopts such a 
perspective — one, presumably, thatis consistent with the demands of financial capital. 
However, such a metaphorical perspective seems inconsistent with the ‘embedding’ of a 
safety culture at BP. 
 
Observation #14. The resoluteness of the rhetorical flourish ‘…and we intend to do just 
that’ seems ominous. The notions of ‘mak[ing] this portfolio work harder’ and TH’s 
expressed intent to do so (‘we intend to do just that’) seem egregiously single-focused. 
                                                          
8 It is possible that this ‘asset base’ included the company’s workforce. 
9 BP’s shareholders suffered direct economic losses from the explosion and ensuing events. According to Stout 
(2012, p. 1), the company’s suspension of dividends and its share price deterioration resulted in a ‘decline of BP’s 
total market value amounting to nearly $100 billion.’ 
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Such CEO-speak is not conducive to the promotion of a safety culture. Such a rhetorical 
flourish seems consistent with ‘top-down’ management and inconsistent with the 
ongoing construction of a safety culture. 
  
Lines 187-191 
 
So how do we define the opportunity? There are many ways to view it: from 
company-wide issues such as the gap in earnings versus our peers, to return on 
capital employed versus the competition; and from segment-level issues such as 
improving refining efficiency and closing the gap in fuels value chain performance in 
the US to improving efficiency in our drilling and in the execution of projects in the 
upstream. 
 
Observation #15. Here TH provides some detail in respect of his assertions in lines 183-
185. He adopts a reflective, inquisitorial, professorial pose for rhetorical effect. The 
‘many ways to view it’ signal a multiplicity of perspectives adopted by TH and 
colleagues. Many of the ‘many ways’ involve essentially (lagged) accounting 
performance measures or measures that are largely accounting-based, such as 
‘improving refining efficiency.’ The focus is on technical, economic and financial 
measures. 
 Since space and time with respect to a CEO’s AGM speech are limited, the items 
mentioned are important to the speaker. The ways that TH ‘define[s] the opportunity’, 
are still many more than one, and this signals that TH is aware that success, or 
‘opportunity’, can be measured in many ways. This is a good thing when one is talking 
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about the performance of a company such as BP. Unlike Enron’s leadership, which 
asserted that the company was ‘laser-focused’ on the singular and inapt accounting 
measure of earnings per share (Craig and Amernic, 2004), TH seems more open. 
However, the list of targets ‘exclude the expression of key assumptions which ground 
conclusions.’ Thus, ideologically Lye’s (2008) question 7 is relevant here. Most 
importantly from the perspective of this article, how are these definitions of the 
opportunity linked to TH’s assertion at line 70: ‘Safety remains our number one 
priority’’? 
 
Lines 193-194 
 
Whichever way you look at it, there are significant opportunities for improvement 
and in every case firm plans are in place to close those gaps. 
 
Observation #16. TH and his colleagues are again resolute since ‘in every case firm 
plans are in place to close those gaps.’ This is top-down leadership, both in defining the 
gap, and in setting the ‘firm plans.’ Are the plans negotiated with operating 
management? Are the plans inflexible? What are these ‘firm plans?’ The audience 
should not be satisfied with this underargued and undocumented assertion.  
The phrase ‘Whichever way you look at it, there are significant opportunities for 
improvement’ seems to acknowledge the multiplicity of ways to set targets and measure 
performance. Rhetorically, this is a constructive move. However, the key construct 
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‘improvement’ seems limited, as noted above, to traditional accounting, finance, and 
market constructs. This echoes Lye (2008) questions 1, 2 and 3 in particular.  
 
 Lines 196-197 
 
Our goal over the next few years is to realize the latent potential of our asset base 
by improving the efficiency and effectiveness of everything we do. 
 
Observation #17. We are invited to have faith that BP can introduce a wondrous system 
to effect this promised improvement. There is no hint of magnanimity, reality or humility. 
Rather, the rhetoric seems intended to induce a generally ‘feel good’ mood in TH’s 
audience. Presumably, The audience would not be interested in messy details, nor have 
little interest in exploring the entailments of complex metaphors such as ‘latent potential 
of our asset base.’ Implicitly, this singularly limited, unrealistic, and seemingly anti-
human rhetoric and attendant ideology seem dysfunctional: all that is alleged to be 
needed is economic ‘efficiency and effectiveness’. The assertion ‘…by improving … 
everything we do’ is less-than-realistic and grandiose. Thus, TH’s AGM speech has 
strong traces of a public relations discourse, rather than a credible accountability report.  
 
Lines 218-220 
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Of course the future looks challenging. It always does. But we have emerged from 
2009 in great shape and with renewed confidence and determination. We can see 
the prize and we believe we are well positioned to capture it. 
 
Observation #18. TH frames his conclusion using ‘the future’ as a metaphor.10 The ‘of 
course’ naturalises the challenging nature of ‘the future’ rhetorically, and  is further 
reinforced by ‘It always does.’ On one level, these are mere empty words (Cheney, 
1998). However, rhetorically, their emptiness (or blandness) enables them to carry an 
unnoticed message: that TH and colleagues always face the trials offered by an unruly 
and unpredictable ‘broader environment’ (line 12). The discursive strategy appears to 
be to position TH and his leadership colleagues in a reactive, perhaps forgiving, space 
─ in which they have, at times, little control over this ‘challenging future’. The use of 
‘prize’ is curious too. How is the ‘prize’ defined? Does it include a safer BP, buttressed 
strongly by leadership and an accommodating pro-active tone at the top? Who are the 
‘we’ who can (metaphorically) ‘see’ such an ill-defined ‘prize’? How will ‘we’ recognise 
it? Is a broad range of stakeholders (including ‘the public’) contained within the ‘we’?  
 
Lines 222-224 
 
I want to thank the employees of BP for their commitment - and I want to thank each 
of you as shareholders for your loyalty and support. I hope you will continue to 
support us on the journey that lies ahead. Thank you. 
                                                          
10 TH’s assertion that ‘…the future looks challenging’ is consistent with McDermott’s metaphor of ‘the future as 
challenge’ (1990, pp. 192-195). 
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Observation #19. This is the only time TH mentions ‘employees.’ Presumably, they are 
the ‘our people’ (referred to at lines 65 and 83). If they are so good at outperforming 
their peers (lines 112-114), they deserve more mention. When TH mentions people, he 
seems to be alluding to senior managers. Such an attitude towards the other employees 
of BP is consistent with the rest of his speech. Although TH was formally addressing 
shareholders, he ought to have been conscious that his speech would have a wider 
audience than those physically present.  
 
Observation #20. The speech is dominated by a financial focus. It seems to have a 
public relations template. There is little genuine concern for ‘people issues.’ Thus, the 
words in lines 222-224, and in the speech as a whole, should not be taken literally. 
CEO-speak, as manifest in a speech to an AGM, is an important facet of leadership in 
constructing organisational identity (Amernic and Craig, 2006). 
   
6. Discussion and conclusions  
Through the lens of the triptych of metaphor, ideology and rhetoric, we have 
highlighted the discourse used by BP’s CEO, Hayward, in his April 20, 2010 AGM 
speech to ‘shape’ safety culture and develop attitudes to safety. The speech engages 
rhetorically in attempts at ‘sensemaking’, constructing intersubjective ‘commonsense’, 
establishing institutionalized norms, and promoting an internalization of ‘the best way of 
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doing this.’ But it is disingenuous. It invites belief in an ideology: that BP is going to do 
what few (if any) corporations can do or have done… drive down costs and increase 
capital efficiency whilst maintaining a first priority of safe and reliable operations. Does 
TH really believe BP can do this? Or is he simply telling ostensibly gullible shareholders 
what he thinks they want to hear? Perhaps his speech is simply corporate jingoism: a 
deliberately ‘upbeat account’ (Breeze, 2012, p. 15) and a public rallying cry for the 
benefit of the managers and board members present?  
TH claims to have made BP’s ‘asset base work harder’ (line 9). Through resultant 
economic efficiency, he claims to have mediated the effects of climate change (line 22, 
ff.). This is disturbing and misleading. Whereas Hayward is expansive throughout about 
how and why economic efficiency will be achieved, he does not mention any 
implications for safety or operational management. Nor does he mention how cutting 
costs through ‘driving down’ things will affect safety, employee welfare, job security and 
good environmental citizenship (all of which plausibly affect safety culture). An implicit 
taboo here needs deconstructing (Martin, 1990). This is the taboo to never acknowledge 
the effect on safety of a drive to cut costs and enhance economic efficiency. 
It is improbable that any ‘drive’ to increase efficiency (described variously by TH as 
reducing costs, countering cost inflation, driving down production costs, reducing cash 
costs by 15%, focusing steadfastly on efficiency) would not affect other parts of BP’s 
complex web of operations. Inevitably, there would be disadvantageous flow-on effects 
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to one or more areas of safety, employee morale, job security, and the condition of 
capital equipment. The idea that economic efficiency can be achieved by improving 
capital efficiency, but without compromising safety in some way, is bold. TH seems 
obsessed with economic efficiency and beating competitors. Despite TH’s platitudes 
regarding safety, the BP he leads will be ‘driven’ to cut costs on operations and safety 
wherever it can. The tone at the top is one of ‘join us on a journey to a financial Nirvana 
– we’ll be lean and keen and operationally sound.’ 
A master metaphor courses through the speech:  
 
BP IS ON A JOURNEY TOWARDS A GREAT FINANCIAL PRIZE 
 
This is a classic example of the ‘wagon train’ metaphor, described in the context of labor 
relations by Dunn (1990). This metaphor is regarded by Amernic and Craig (2006, p. 
60) to be a journey  
 
… into unknown territory [that must be undertaken] by organized, self-confident leaders and 
acquiescent non-leaders. They must move forward towards the greater public good. This notion is 
nicely captured by the … illuminating image of a ‘wagon train’ voyaging across the hostile, virtually 
limitless, American frontier. 
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As the text of line 18 suggests, despite the inevitable challenges in the path of the 
BP ‘wagon train’, we can rest assured because the ‘heroic leader’ or trail boss [TH] will 
get us to our destination. The BP wagon train has moved ahead successfully because 
BP has ‘refreshed’ its trail bosses (line 84) and has reviewed its ‘whole approach to the 
organization’ of the wagon train (lines 84-85). Furthermore, we are regaled with what an 
excellent team, organisation and system the BP wagon train has. It has ‘closed gaps,’ 
‘restored momentum’ and ‘grown production’ (lines 95-97). Despite this, the BP wagon 
train is obsessed with its ‘track record,’ and what other ‘wagon trains’ (its peers) are 
doing. The trail boss [TH] says, ‘we can see the prize … the journey lies ahead’ (lines 
219, 223-224). Here the ideological effect of the metaphor and rhetoric are evident. The 
prize is a reward to capital, not a reward to labour, the environment or social equity. The 
prize is not an exemplary safety performance or a work environment that represents an 
absence of harm. 
The few references to safety by Hayward in his 19 speeches, including the April 20, 
2010 AGM speech (and by his predecessor Browne’s 125 speeches delivered during 
his tenure as BP’s CEO) indicates that the concept of ‘safety culture’ existed in a 
curious linguistic lacuna in BP’s upper management echelon. Hayward and Browne 
(partly through their discourse) helped to shape a culture at BP that gave short shrift to 
safety. Indeed, their leadership language (as evidenced in their public speeches) did not 
reflect the complexity of a safety culture. Rather, the culture they endorsed and 
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promoted encouraged greater attention to financial and operating efficiency, and to 
attendant organisational management control systems and procedures. 
An important reminder emerging from our analysis is that words (and other 
symbols) matter. At times, the words of powerful corporate leaders matter more than 
most. As a reinforcing and concluding codicil, we draw attention to the words used in a 
speech to the Economic Club of Chicago on January 13, 2012 (almost two years after 
the explosion) by the [then] current CEO of BP, Bob Dudley. He stated: ‘The Deepwater 
Horizon accident and oil spill took eleven lives, injured dozens more, and disrupted the 
livelihoods of people in the Gulf Coast region’ (Dudley 2012, p. 94). However, the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster was not simply an ‘accident’ according to numerous 
observers (Elkind et al., 2011). The word ‘disrupted’ is far too mild. Limiting comment to 
‘livelihoods’ is disingenuous too because it crudely ignores major health and 
environmental effects. Dudley (2012, p. 94) continued by claiming ‘Despite our best 
efforts, some oil did reach the shore.’ Some? Dudley makes no mention of any 
culpability, remote or otherwise, for the effects of ‘the company’s evident failure to bring 
the problem rapidly under control’ (Breeze, 2012, p. 11). He ignores the likely on-going 
effects of the oil that dispersed in the waters and seabed of the Gulf of Mexico. 
The leadership words in public speeches of a succession of CEOs of BP (Browne, 
Hayward, and Dudley) are troubling. They helped to constitute and reflect the nature of 
the company’s culture and the rather anemic safety component of that culture. Our 
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analysis has focused specifically on Hayward’s 2010 AGM speech (although we did 
briefly consider his other eighteen public speeches, as well as the many speeches 
delivered by his predecessor, Lord Browne). The tentative definition of ‘safety culture’ 
introduced in section 2 (‘… the ongoing construction of underlying assumptions, beliefs, 
values and attitudes shared by members of an organization in moving to an 
environment characterized by a quest for an absence of harm’) accorded CEO-speak a 
critical role.  
Within the context of our analysis of CEO Hayward’s 2010 AGM, this critical role 
relates to what Blazsin and Guldenmund (2015, p.18) argue, in their discussion of 
safety culture construction, ‘…appear as ongoing, dynamic, never-ending processes’, 
characterized by four recurring stages. Their second stage (‘Interaction’), third stage 
(‘Institutionalization’), and fourth stage (‘Internalization’) seem especially important with 
respect to CEO-speak. The ideology and metaphor of the CEO's speech as a rhetorical 
device could have aided in the social construction of a safety culture at BP. Our analysis 
did not find evidence of this in the AGM speech by CEO Hayward. 
Close monitoring of the language of CEOs is important in an age of powerful global 
corporations. This is especially the case when many corporate leaders become 
insulated by extreme wealth, protected from reality by boards and colleagues, and 
influenced by an ideology of extreme efficiency. They lose a grip on things that matter 
most ─ such as putting in place a safe environment offering an absence of harm.  
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Appendix A 
CEO Hayward's Corpus of Eighteen Speeches Prior to the 2010 AGM Speech 
(downloaded from www.bp.com) 
 
No. Date 
  
Title Venue Words 
1 June 4, 
2007 
Delivering Technologies via Carbon 
Markets  
GLOBE Berlin 
Legislators Forum, 
Berlin  
2992 
2 June 11, 
2007 
Securing the Future - An Oil Company 
Perspective  
EAGE Annual 
Conference London  
2203 
3 June 17, 
2007 
Investing in Russia: A BP perspective  Investing in Prosperity 
conference - Moscow 
2311 
4 Nov 8, 
2007 
Energy Security and America  Houston 2000 
5 April 17, 
2008 
Speech, 2008 AGM London 2224 
6 June 9, 
2008 
How to Expand Energy Supply in the 
21st Century  
13th Asia Oil & Gas 
Conference, Kuala 
Lumpur 
3141 
7 June 30, 
2008 
Speech at the World Petroleum Council  World Petroleum 
Council, Madrid 
1847 
8 July 3, 
2008 
Speech at the London 2012 Olympic 
Games Sponsorship event 
British Museum, London 626 
9 Nov 25, 
2008 
Delivering Energy for Sustainable 
Growth  
Tsinghua University, 
Beijing 
3006 
10 Dec17, 
2008 
Remarks, HRH Prince of Wales's 3rd 
Annual Accounting for Sustainability 
Forum 
London 1291 
11 Feb 10, 
2009 
28th CERA Executive Conference - 
Opening speech  
 Houston 2401 
12 April 16, 
2009 
Speech, 2009 AGM  
 
ExCel centre, 
Docklands, London 
2205 
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13 May 14, 
2009 
Speech accepting the Institute's first 
Energy Innovator Award 
Institute of The 
Americas Conference, 
La Jolla, California  
1746 
14 Oct 8, 
2009 
The Role of Gas in the Future of Energy  World Gas Conference, 
Buenos Aires 
2000 
15 Oct 20, 
2009 
Meeting the Energy Challenge  Oil and Money 
Conference, London 
2330 
16 Oct 29, 
2009 
The Harsh Realities of Energy  MIT 3275 
17 Dec 4, 
2009 
Energy Pathways - Setting a course to a 
sustainable energy future  
World Oil and Gas 
Assembly, Bangalore 
2635 
18 March 23, 
2010 
Energy security through diversity  Peterson Institute 2608 
     
Total Words  40896 
Average Words per Speech  2272 
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Appendix B 
Tony Hayward’s Speech to the 2010 AGM 
[line numbers added] 
 
See next page 
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Good morning ladies and gentlemen. It's great to see so many of you here today and thank you 1 
for your support over the past year.  2 
 3 
I'd like to start by welcoming Carl-Henric to BP and to his first AGM. As an international 4 
business leader, Carl-Henric has brought a fresh perspective and a wealth of experience to the 5 
company, and I am very much enjoying working with him.  6 
 7 
BP has made a lot of progress over the last three years, but there's still more to do. We now have 8 
a real opportunity to make our asset base work harder for our shareholders and today I'd like to 9 
explain how we plan to make that happen. 10 
 11 
But first let me begin by looking at the broader environment and how it is shaping our priorities. 12 
In the short term, the global downturn has reduced energy demand although we expect oil 13 
demand to grow again in 2010, probably by about a million barrels a day. And over the longer 14 
term, driven by industrialisation and rising living standards in the developing economies, global 15 
energy consumption will continue to rise.  16 
 17 
Of course a number of big challenges lie ahead, especially in the realm of policy, where the 18 
question of how to meet rising energy demand in an affordable and sustainable way has risen to 19 
the top of the global political agenda.  20 
 21 
For a long time now, BP has advocated a proactive approach to climate change and supported 22 
action to curb carbon emissions. And we continue to believe that the world needs a diverse 23 
energy mix that incorporates all available sources from oil sands to solar and leverages 24 
investment in technology.  25 
 26 
Key to this is a need to promote efficiency to minimise the environmental impact of fossil fuels 27 
and to ensure we maximise best use of the world's energy resources. This will help to provide 28 
secure supplies of energy as well as addressing climate change.  29 
 30 
We also believe that encouraging free and open energy markets is the best way to induce change. 31 
A carbon price, preferably created by capping emissions, would provide a strong incentive to 32 
encourage energy efficiency and investment in alternatives to fossil fuels.  33 
 34 
BP is supporting the transition to a low-carbon economy in a number of ways: firstly by 35 
improving energy efficiency within our own operations, as well as by developing more efficient 36 
products such as BP Ultimate and Castrol lubricants.  37 
 38 
Secondly, by using an internal cost of carbon when making investment decisions about fossil 39 
fuel projects. This encourages investment in technology to reduce carbon emissions.  40 
 41 
And thirdly by promoting the lowest-cost energy pathways to reduce emissions a good example 42 
being the use of natural gas to generate power. Gas is easily the cleanest-burning fossil fuel - it's 43 
efficient, versatile and abundantly available.  44 
 45 
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We also continue to invest in our low-carbon businesses; since 2005 we have invested more than 46 
$4 billion in Alternative Energy, and focused our activity in four key areas:  47 
-In Biofuels we're converting sugar cane to ethanol in Brazil. In the UK we're constructing an 48 
ethanol manufacturing plant and a technology demonstration plant for biobutanol with DuPont. 49 
And in the US we are working on the conversion of ligno-cellulosic material to biofuels.  50 
-In Wind we've focused the business in the US where we already have more than 1.2 gigawatts 51 
of gross capacity spinning. We expect this business to become cash flow positive this year.  52 
-In Solar we've focused the business and we're repositioning our manufacturing footprint to 53 
lower-cost locations, principally in India and China. 54 
-And in Carbon Capture and Sequestration we're concentrating on two major projects - one in 55 
California, the other in Abu Dhabi.  56 
 57 
All this is underpinned by our continuing investment in research and technology. BP currently 58 
has 20 major technology programmes underway. Around two thirds relate to existing businesses 59 
and the remainder to new forms of energy and ways of making today's energy more efficient.  60 
 61 
Our priorities which lie at the heart of all our operations remain safety, people and performance. 62 
This is what we call our Forward Agenda. Our focus on safe and reliable operations is now 63 
strongly embedded in all our businesses; we are continuing to build the on the core capabilities 64 
of our people; and we have started to see the benefits of improved operational performance 65 
flowing through to the bottom line.  66 
 67 
Let me address each of these in turn.  68 
 69 
Safety remains our number one priority and I'm pleased to report we can see clear progress. 70 
There has been a significant reduction in the frequency of recordable injuries and the number of 71 
major incidents related to integrity failures has also fallen. At the same time we're reducing 72 
containment losses in our operations.  73 
 74 
We are continuing to improve our skills and capabilities as we roll out a common Operating 75 
Management System across our business. By the end of 2009 we'd fully implemented this at 70 76 
sites - covering around 80 per cent of our operations and the remainder will be completed this 77 
year.  78 
 79 
But implementation is just the beginning. Our Operating Management System provides the 80 
framework to now drive continuous improvement across all of our operations.  81 
 82 
Our people have been fundamental to the company's transformation over the last few years. Not 83 
only have we refreshed the highest levels of leadership within BP, but we have also reviewed our 84 
whole approach to the organisation. We are focussing on deepening our capability by putting the 85 
right people with the right skills in the right places. And we are ensuring they can reinforce their 86 
technical and functional expertise through development programmes like our Operations 87 
Academies.  88 
 89 
We are continuing our drive to create a diverse and inclusive workplace to ensure that we can 90 
attract and retain the best talent. And we have linked reward more closely to performance.  91 
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 92 
These changes have been clearly reflected in improved operational performance.  93 
 94 
Over the last two years we have closed the competitive gap that we identified in 2007, and 95 
restored momentum in our core businesses. In 2009 we grew production by 4 per cent, building 96 
on the track record of momentum relative to our peers since 2000. In refining we have brought 97 
our US network back to full operation, and our system is now back to pre-2005 levels of 98 
availability.  99 
 100 
The drive to increase efficiency and reduce costs remains a key focus for everyone at BP. We 101 
started more than two years ago in our effort to counter cost inflation and drive much greater 102 
efficiency into our business.  103 
 104 
In the upstream we are leading our peer group in driving down production costs, with BP's unit 105 
costs in 2009 12 per cent lower than in 2008. We will maintain this momentum through activity 106 
choice and in the way we manage the supply chain. In the downstream our efficiency initiatives 107 
have reduced cash costs by more than 15 per cent in 2009 and our goal over the next 2 to 3 years 108 
is to return costs to 2004 levels. For the group as a whole we reduced our cash costs last year by 109 
more than $4 billion.  110 
 111 
In 2009, lower oil and gas prices and weak refining margins created a challenging environment 112 
for the whole sector. But the operational momentum in our business and our steadfast focus on 113 
efficiency has clearly improved our performance relative to our peers.  114 
 115 
Despite a challenging year, this performance meant we could distribute $10.5 billion to 116 
shareholders and increase our dividend to 56 cents per share. It's also been reflected in our 117 
relative share price performance since the beginning of last year; we have outperformed ALL our 118 
major competitors.  119 
 120 
As well as delivering a good operational performance in 2009, we saw significant strategic 121 
progress across the company.  122 
 123 
In E&P we achieved major new access to resources and made a series of significant discoveries. 124 
We have maintained our strong track record of reserve replacement. This is our 17th consecutive 125 
year in which we are able to report a reserves replacement above 100 per cent. Year-on-year 126 
production growth was 4 per cent. We started up seven major projects and sanctioned two 127 
notable new developments.  128 
 129 
In R&M, our refining system has been fully restored. We decapitalised our US convenience 130 
retail business and reduced the geographic footprint of our international businesses. At the same 131 
time costs have come down by 15 per cent.  132 
 133 
Alternative Energy is more focused and disciplined. And we have furthered our corporate 134 
simplification agenda, reducing headcount by around 7500.  135 
 136 
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Let me give you a little more detail on how we strengthened our portfolio of oil and gas reserves 137 
in 2009. Our discoveries included the giant Tiber oil field in the Gulf of Mexico the deepest well 138 
ever drilled in the industry. Indeed it lies further below the Earth's surface than the summit of 139 
Mount Everest does above it.  140 
 141 
A particular highlight was our return to Iraq where we signed a contract to redevelop the 142 
supergiant Rumaila field in partnership with the Chinese National Petroleum Company. The 143 
project will help Iraqis to develop new skills as well as generate income to assist in rebuilding 144 
the country.  145 
 146 
In the US we expanded our shale gas portfolio by securing a new position in the Eagle Ford 147 
Shale. We established a Coal Bed Methane position in Indonesia. And in Jordan we agreed to 148 
join with the National Petroleum Company to exploit the Risha gas field.  149 
 150 
And we have continued to add resources in 2010, most notably through the acquisition of $7 151 
billion worth of assets from Devon Energy that we announced last month. These include 152 
significant deepwater interests in Brazil and the Gulf of Mexico.  153 
 154 
Over the last two years, through exploration, appraisal and access, we have added a total of 155 
around 7.5 billion barrels of new resources that's five years' worth of production replaced in just 156 
two - and that excludes Iraq.  157 
 158 
Our strong resource base reinforces the prospects for future production growth. Last year I said 159 
that we expected to grow production between 1 and 2 per cent a year to 2013. We are now 160 
confident that at a $60 per barrel oil price we can sustain average production growth from 2008 161 
at 1 to 2 per cent a year out to 2015.  162 
 163 
This production profile is underpinned by 42 new projects, which will start up between now and 164 
2015. Together they will contribute around 1 million barrels a day to total production by 2015. 165 
They are concentrated in the Gulf of Mexico, the North Sea, Azerbaijan and Angola, which are 166 
all high margin production areas.  167 
 168 
The strategic progress that we made in 2009 is part of a longer track record. Over the past decade 169 
our strategy has allowed us to build a portfolio of great quality and huge potential: equal in our 170 
view to any in our industry in terms of the key measures shown here.  171 
 172 
We have a long history as both an efficient and successful explorer. This has given us a reserve 173 
replacement track record which is among the best in the industry, and a long-lived asset base 174 
with a bias to conventional oil. We have confidence in robust medium term growth and 175 
considerable potential to apply new technologies to further improve recovery.  176 
 177 
In R&M despite a difficult environment - we have less overall exposure to refining than our 178 
peers. We have high-graded our portfolio over the past decade to end up with, on average, larger 179 
and more advantaged refineries than the other super-majors. We believe we also have the best 180 
supply optimisation capability and a set of world class international businesses.  181 
 182 
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However while our portfolio ranks amongst the best in the industry, our financial performance 183 
has yet to fully reflect this. There is now a real opportunity to make this portfolio work harder for 184 
us and we intend to do just that. 185 
 186 
So how do we define the opportunity? There are many ways to view it: from company-wide 187 
issues such as the gap in earnings versus our peers, to return on capital employed versus the 188 
competition; and from segment-level issues such as improving refining efficiency and closing the 189 
gap in fuels value chain performance in the US to improving efficiency in our drilling and in the 190 
execution of projects in the upstream.  191 
 192 
Whichever way you look at it, there are significant opportunities for improvement and in every 193 
case firm plans are in place to close those gaps.  194 
 195 
Our goal over the next few years is to realise the latent potential of our asset base by improving 196 
the efficiency and effectiveness of everything we do.  197 
 198 
We will vigorously drive cost and capital efficiency whilst at the same time maintaining our first 199 
priority of safe and reliable operations.  200 
 201 
In E&P, we will drive efficiency through a new organisational structure. This will provide 202 
clearer accountabilities and a centralised approach to project management. For example, it will 203 
ensure that we use standard designs and equipment for similar projects in different parts of the 204 
world.  205 
 206 
In R&M, we will focus on efficiency, quality and integration as we start to realise the potential 207 
of our refinery network and restructured fuel value chains.  208 
 209 
All of this will be underpinned by our continuing investment in technology and by the new 210 
culture we are establishing at BP.  211 
 212 
So to sum up, our strategy remains unchanged but we are now embarking on a new phase in 213 
which we intend to realise the full potential of the portfolio we've built up over the past decade. 214 
We have considerable scope to pursue sector leadership, particularly in costs, capital efficiency 215 
and margin quality.  216 
 217 
Of course the future looks challenging. It always does. But we have emerged from 2009 in great 218 
shape and with renewed confidence and determination. We can see the prize and we believe we 219 
are well positioned to capture it.  220 
 221 
I want to thank the employees of BP for their commitment - and I want to thank each of you as 222 
shareholders for your loyalty and support. I hope you will continue to support us on the journey 223 
that lies ahead. Thank you. 224 
 225 
